Abstract. This article, the second of a two-part essay, outlines a solution to certain tensions in Thomist philosophical anthropology concerning the interaction of the human person's immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory operations that are constituted from the formal organization of the nervous system. Continuing with where the first part left off, I argue that Thomists should not be tempted by strong emergentist accounts of mental operations that act directly on the brain, but should maintain, with Aquinas, that noetic operations directly interact with psychosomatic operations. I develop a Thomist account of noetic-psychosomatic interactions that expands upon the first part's rapprochement between the new mechanist philosophy of neuroscience and psychology and hylomorphic animalism. I argue that noetic-psychosomatic interactions are best understood as analogous to the way diverse higher and lower order psychosomatic powers interact by actualizing, coordinating, and directing the operations of other psychosomatic powers. I draw on James Ross's arguments for the immateriality of intellectual operations as realizing definite pure functions in order to elucidate the way noetic operations uniquely actualize, coordinate, and direct the psychosomatic operations they interact with. I conclude with a conjectural sketch of how this presentation of Thomist philosophical anthropology understands the noetic and psychosomatic deficits brought about by damage to the nervous system.
Abbreviations for the works of St. Thomas Aquinas
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In the first article, I introduced the well-known distinction between personal and sub-personal level attributes. In this article, I shall reserve this distinction for human persons and will employ a similar distinction between psychological and sub-psychological (or animal and sub-animal) level attributes in my treatment of topics common to humans and other animals.
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Elsewhere I have argued that HMA can accommodate the insights of NMP and that HMA's ontology of animal psychology can find in NMP the prospects of a complementary philosophy of biology, neuroscience, psychology. I take such claims for granted in this essay. See De Haan 2017a.
Thomist Hylomorphic Personalism
Because human persons are rational animals, Thomists approach both humans and other animals as unified wholes that can be understood by first describing their activities in the world, then analyzing these integrated activities into distinct objects and operations, which in turn illuminate the distinct powers possessed by humans and other animals, which help us to understand the substance and nature that distinguishes humans from other animals. In a word: from an experienced, understood, conceptualized, and verified multi-form unity, we begin the arduous task of differentiating the objects, operations, and powers grounded by a substance's nature. This analysis is ultimately ordered towards a unified and integrated description and explanation of the whole (See ST I.77.1-8; In DA II, lt. 5-6). This phenomenological cum philosophical analysis of the given polymorphic unity of conscious human experiences refracts into the myriad formal objects intentionalized by different psychological operations of apprehension:
visibles by seeing, audibles by hearing, tangibles by touching, affordances by enactive perceptual registrations, imagables by imagining, intelligibles by intellectual abstraction, insight, conceptualization, and rational verification.
Thomas Aquinas, like most medieval Aristotelians, maintained that intellectual operations and the intentionalized intelligibles they apprehend completely transcend the conditions of materiality. Consequently, neither intellectual operations nor the intellectual powers that enable these noetic operations are embodied in biological organs like the nervous system.
Aquinas writes,
Some powers of the soul, namely the intellect and will, are in the soul insofar as it exceeds the total capacity of the body; hence, powers of this sort are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers, however, are common to the soul and the body, hence each of these powers … is only in that part of the body which is adapted (proportionata) to the operation of such a power. The human soul's mode of existence can be known from its operation. For insofar as the human soul has an operation that transcends materiality, its existence transcends the body and does not depend on the body. … Therefore, if the human soul insofar as it is united as form to the body also has an existence that transcends the body, and does not depend on the body, it is manifest that the soul itself is established on the boundary between corporeal and separate substances. QDdA 1 (Leon., 10: 337-341).
Because intellectual operations transcend the conditions of matter and cannot be reduced to any psychosomatic properties, the very being and subsistence of the human person and its animating substantial form cannot be reduced to any embodied or material principles. Aquinas contends that the immateriality of the intellectual soul does not undermine his view that the human person is a hylomorphically constituted animal, because, like the sensory soul of other animals, the intellectual soul can animate and organize the organic body as its substantial form. 4 The intellectual soul: 4 "One must claim that the intellect, which is the principle of intellectual operation, is the form of the human body. For that by which something primarily operates (primo operatur) is the form of that to which the operation is attributed. For instance, that by which the body is primarily healed is health, and that by which the soul primarily knows is knowledge (scientia); hence, health is a form belonging to the body, and knowledge is a form belonging to the soul. The reason for this is that nothing acts except insofar as it is actually such-and-such, and so that by which it is actually such-and-such is that by which it acts. But it is obvious that the soul is that by which the body is primarily alive. And since life is made manifest by different operations within the different grades of living things, the soul is that by which we perform each of these vital acts. For instance, the soul is that by which we primarily assimilate nourishment (nutrimur), have sensory cognition (sentimus), and move from place to place (movemur secundum locum); and, similarly, the soul is that by which we primarily have intellective understanding (intelligimus). Therefore, this principle by which we primarily have intellective understanding-regardless of whether it is called the intellect or the intellective soul-is the form of the body." ST I.76.1 (Freddoso, mod. trans. See ST I-II.9.1; DV 24.5 (Lonergan 1992; Lonergan 1997; Ross 2008; Braine 1992 Braine , 2014 .
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See Ross 2008, 97 . Wonder, the desire to know, and abstraction are preconditions for intellectual operations of rational enquiry, understanding, formulation, rational reflection, and judgmental understanding-the operations Aquinas attributes to a noetic power called the potential intellect (intellectus possibilis). Wonder-along with any acquired virtues of a disciplined intelligent enquirer that enhance wonder-disposes one's capacity for intellectual abstraction insofar as it aims one's intellectual discrimination and attention towards what is relevant over what is irrelevant. Metaphysically speaking, abstraction is a distinct operation for intellectual intentionalization that Aquinas attributes to a noetic power called the active intellect (intellectus agens). For Aquinas, the abstractive operation of the active intellect produces actually immaterial intentionalized intelligible content that is derived from an intelligent engagement with the potentially intelligible content of phantasms. See Aquinas, In DA III.4-5, lt. 7-10; ST I.54.4; 79.1-5; 84-89; Lonergan 1997, ch. 4. 9 See ST I. 16.2; 17.2-3; 84.7-8; Lonergan 1988; Lonergan 1992; Ross 2008. 10 See Bennett and Hacker 2003; Hacker 2008; Nachev and Hacker 2014; Brock 1998; Wojtyła 1979; De Haan 2011; De Haan 2014 .
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Additionally, it is worth noting that both linguistic apprehension and expression are part and parcel of the complex coordinated operations of the internal sensorium that Aquinas calls phantasia. Indeed, the intellect's natural proclivity to be constantly oriented to the phantasms has been rightly interpreted by Bernard Lonergan, Etienne Gilson, James Ross, David Braine, Alasdair MacIntyre, and many others to reflect Aquinas's deep appreciation of how crucial language is, not just for expressing human knowledge, but more fundamentally for facilitating intellectual enquiry, understanding, conceptualization, rational reflection, intelligent judgments, practical reasoning, and thinking within the medium of words. 
Noetic and Psychosomatic Interactions in a Thomist Hylomorphic Personalism
I propose to address this question in two stages. The interaction among distinct psychosomatic operations provides an initial paradigm that I then extend to include the intellectual operations of the intellect. So, the for- What does this technical jargon mean? In the first case, a dog sees a colored moving object, perceptually registers it as a squirrel that affords
pursuit, which thereby motivates the dog to chase the squirrel. In the second instance, the dog is conveying a freshly slain rabbit to its pups when it notices a squirrel darting across its path, but because the dog is sufficiently determined towards its present course, the motivation to chase the squirrel is inhibited and the dog continues on its way. Each of these psychosomatic operations enlists a distinct, though interactive, cascade of coordinated manifestations of powers constituted from organized hierarchies of neurophysiological and other biological levels of mechanisms. And just as neural assemblies in the visual cortex interact with neural assemblies in the medial temporal lobe, parietal lobe, frontal lobe, and so forth, so also the animal's conscious seeing directly interacts with and shapes or is shaped by its conscious enactive perceptions and executive registrations to do something. For instance, an animal's psychosomatic powers for executive registrations enable the animal to recognize and engage with salient affordances in its environment or to pursue objects that will satisfy some biopsychosocial imperative. Executive registrations also enable the animal to control its attention and inhibit distracting affordances-evoked by environmental or endogenous stimuli, e.g., fleeing squirrels or the pangs of hunger-that might motivate it to switch tasks while it is pursuing a determinate goal. Animal agency of this kind requires that the operations of an animal's psychosomatic powers are able to inhibit other psychosomatic powers, while also coordinating and organizing the conscious operations of other powers, and ordering or directing them to the achievement of the biopsychosocial imperatives that presently occupy the animal's attention. In order for a dog to return home to its pups, it must be able to harness and direct its enactive capacities for seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, perceiving, executive registering, and bodily movements to the task at hand, without being distracted by the kaleidoscope of other salient affordances it passes by along the way. 12 This quotidian example provides a clear illustration of how distinct psychosomatic powers are able to interact with other psychosomatic powers by directing and controlling the coordinated manifestations of some psychosomatic powers while inhibiting the manifestation of others. The directed operations function as material potentialities or instruments to be actualized and formally ordered by the directing operations. Aquinas drew a similar conclusion in his treatment of the unity of human action.
Now just as, in the case of a genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form, in the way that a man is composed of soul and body, and yet is one natural being even though it has many parts, so too, in the case of human acts, the act of a lower power is related as matter to the act of a higher power because the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power's actualizing it; for the act of the first agent is related as a form to the act of its instrument. Hence, it is clear that the act of commanding and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is one, but many in its parts. My claim here is that in many cases, inhibitory control is not simply an activity attributed to various sub-animal or sub-psychological level information filters carried out by the "cognitive information processing" capacities of the nervous system. Rather, this kind of neural inhibition (or "cognitive" inhibition) must be distinguished from a genuinely psychosomatic form of inhibition, which is a form of psychological organization proper to the psychological level attributes of the animal. 
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Definite Pure Functions Realized by Noetic Operations
For HMA, conscious psychosomatic operations, and the powers that ground understanding, that is, "judgmental understanding capable of truth or falsity," (Ross 2008, 197, n. 5 ) is different in principle from these psychosomatic operations; it cannot be wholly explained by any kind of physical explanation, including the ontologically generous kinds of explanation provided by HMA.
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Third, Ross, like Aquinas, maintains that human understanding in this life always involves "a physical medium in-which." (Ross 2008, 116) . He notes, "it is only the understanding element that I am now trying to show cannot 13 In their insightful account of radical enactivist cognition, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin introduce a similar distinction between the basic intentionality of nonhuman animals and the truth-content involving intentionality of rational animals. Aristotelians will find a lot to appreciate in the work of Hutto and Myin and it is worth considering what bearing Ross's arguments would have on their naturalistic account of radical enactivist cognition and what they call the "hard problem of content." See Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017. be wholly physical; understandings that involve sensation or feeling cannot be entirely nonphysical either, anymore than my going for a walk can be a mere willing." (Ross 2008, 197, n. 5) . It is truth-carrying understanding or thinking that Ross contends requires intrinsic features that "no physical thing or process can have at all." (Ross 2008, 116 Ross's central claim is that human judgmental understanding realizes definite pure functions all of the time, and that no wholly physical process can realize definite pure functions. The prevalence of intellectual operations performing such definite pure functions should not be underestimated. Ross has in mind all intelligent realizations of any definite pure function from logic or mathematics, or, for instance, any of the pure functions that are touched upon in the late E.J. Lowe's Forms of Thought, such as reference, predication, identity, modality, conditionality, generality, negation, existence, and truth.
These pure functions or forms of thought also include Bernard Lonergan's treatment of the normative exigencies of intelligence and rationality, as well as the late David Braine's account of the "general logic" that underlies and is incorporated into grammar (Lowe 2013; Lonergan 1992; Braine 2014, 36-47, 748-749) . When I intellectually reason by employing a definite pure function, like modus ponens ("If p then q; p; therefore q"), my intellectual operation realizes a definite form of valid reasoning. It cannot merely approximate the ideal form of modus ponens; my rational understanding must be a definite instance of that pure function that thereby excludes all incompossible pure functions (Ross 2008, 117-23) . The reason why human judgmental understanding cannot be a mere simulation of or fail to be of a definite pure form is because if it did fail, then judgmental understanding would "fail to have the defining features of conjunction, disjunction, modus ponens, addition, and so on, upon which validity, consistency, and the like depend." (Ross 2008, 117) .
In a word: our thinking, in a single case, can be of a definite abstract form (e.g., N x N = N 2 ), and not indeterminate among incompossible equally most particular forms. … No physical process can be that definite in its form in a single case. Adding physical instances even to infinity will not exclude incompossible equally most particular forms (cf. Saul Kripke's "plus/quus" examples). So, no physical process can exclude incompossible functions from being equally well (or badly satisfied…)
Thus, no physical process can be the whole of such thinking. (Ross 2008, 116 ).
Ross anticipates the skeptical reactions of his analytic philosophy colleagues. He points out that many analytic philosophers not only attribute more bizarre features to propositions, but also, and more to the point, that his argument does not rest upon the peculiarity of certain ancient or medieval philosophical views, but on the "jewels of analytic philosophy:
the underdetermination of hypotheses by data and the indeterminacy of the physical." (Ross 2008, 116 (1955, , and the "plus-quus" considerations of Kripke (1982, 9 and passim) . " Ross 2008 , 119. For Ross's references, see Goodman 1983 Kripke 1982 . 15 Ross also anticipates the evasion that humans, like physical machines, merely simulate pure functions like contradiction and modus ponens; we might be able to define them, but we do not realize them. The problem with this dodge is that, "there is a pragmatic contradiction in denying that we can think in pure functions. To define such a function is to think in a form that is not indeterminate among incompossible forms. And to deny explicitly that we can do a specified operation, whether add, conjoin, […] or define particular functions, like conjunction, is to do what is being denied. Such an epidemic of theoretical doubt as to what we can do, without any effect on one's own practical certainty, must involve a mistake." (Ross 2008, 121-22) .
of definite pure functions that do exclude all incompossible pure functions is characteristic of ordinary exercises of human intellectual understanding.
The details of Ross's argument and the defense of its premises is beyond the limits of this essay. I shall presume that Ross's argument is cogent.
What does Ross's account of the immateriality of intellectual operations that realize definite pure functions tell us about the interaction of noetic operations with psychosomatic operations?
Even though they transcend the conditions of matter, the intellectual operations that really employ these definite pure functions are performed by human persons, and as Ross points out, they are regularly exercised in such a way that these intellectual operations organize and direct psychosomatic operations such that they are governed by these pure functions. Intellectual operations are constantly shaping or ordering our enactive capacities for perceptual registrations as well as any phenomenal presentations of phantasia. For example, human linguistic apprehension and expression involve psychosomatic operations, but these psychosomatic operations as such are not able to realize definite pure functions. However, when human persons ratiocinate intelligently they do deploy and realize definite pure functions in their intellectual thinking, and characteristically do so while thinking "in the medium of words," that is, by apprehending or expressing intelligent speech. And intelligent speech comprises the psychosomatic operations involved in linguistic production or expression that are governed, organized, and directed by intellectual operations that do realize definite pure functions like conjunction, modus ponens, modus tollens, and so forth.
A complementary point is made by David Braine in his comprehensive study,
Language and Human Understanding.
The brain is vital to us as bodily beings if our understanding is to find expression in speech and in coordination with perception, imagination, memory, emotion, and action. But the role of the brain is rather to facilitate our expression of understanding and thinking in the medium of words than to embody it. Our thinking is not embodied in language, but expressed using it; nor is it embodied in neural or imaginative sequences. The activities of understanding, thinking, and questioning, with their nonrepresentational character, combined with our freedom in the exercise of the capacity involved exhibited in the lack of definable limits to the flexibility in our use of words, show that these activities cannot be the work of any bodily organ. This does not make them the work of some other organ, but the activities of the person as such. (Braine 2014, 67 are inhibited by the atrophy of its sub-psychological neural systems, then not only will psychosomatic acts of recall be obstructed, so also will all forms of reminiscence that are otherwise governed and directed through interactions with intellectual operations. Intelligent narration that relies upon psychosomatic capacities for reminiscence will be thwarted whenever reminiscence is impeded. So, if reminiscence cannot be exercised-because it cannot enlist the capacities of the crucial neural systems that constitute memory due to neurodegeneration in the medial temporal lobe-then acts of reminiscence cannot be enlisted and guided by noetic operations, and intelligent narration becomes disabled.
In short, even though the deleterious effects of neurodegenerative disorders directly impact the psychosomatic powers and operations constituted from these deteriorating neural systems, they only indirectly impede intellectual powers and operations by inhibiting their capacity to formally govern, order, and direct psychosomatic operations. Any human activities that require the integrated confluence of noetic and psychosomatic operations-which for THP includes all intelligent activities of theoretical and practical reasoning and intentional action in this life-will be obstructed by damage to the sub-psychological neural systems that constitute and enable the psychosomatic powers of the rational animal.
Conclusion
This essay has, via two articles, brought together a variety of moving parts 
